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The falling cost of international business travel and communication motivates highly-
skilled workers who live in developed countries to spend more of their time
co-operating with less-skilled workers in developing countries. This tends to narrow
the gap between developed and developing countries in the wages of less-skilled
workers, but to widen the wage gap within developed countries between highly-skilled
and less-skilled workers. The paper formalizes this mechanism and tests it on data
for the United States and developing countries. The two effects on wage inequalities
of greater co-operation of highly-skilled workers with workers in developing countries
both seem quantitatively important.
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1. Introduction
The debate about globalization and wage inequalities continues to attract attention.
The first phase of the debate focused on the fall in the wages of Northern unskilled
workers, relative to Northern skilled workers, which in principle could be explained
by Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory as a result of falling barriers to trade between
the North and the South (e.g. Leamer, 1993; Wood, 1994), although the magnitude
of this effect in practice was the subject of wide disagreement (e.g. Cline, 1997).
A second phase of the debate was set off by the finding that increased openness
had widened wage gaps between skilled and unskilled workers in some
developing, as well as developed, countries, which could not be explained in the
standard H-O model (Robbins, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Wood, 1997;
Anderson, 2005).
What motivates this paper, though, are two other changes in wage inequalities
which cannot be explained by the H-O mechanism, either. The first is that
wage inequality in the North has increased not only in the lower ranges of the
skill distribution, but also right at the top, where a small group of highly-paid
workers has pulled rapidly, persistently and conspicuously away from the rest
(e.g. Bernstein and Mishel, 1997). The second is that in the Southern countries
which have integrated most successfully into the world economy, the outcome
has been not, as the H-O model would predict, absolute gains for some skill
groups and absolute losses for others, but rather that the wages of all groups
have risen, even though some have gained more than others (e.g. World Bank,
1993, 2003).
These two changes in wage inequalities might be related neither to one another
nor to globalization—the wage gains at the top in the North could be due to new
technology, for example, and those of workers in successful Southern countries
to capital accumulation. Our hypothesis, however, is that the two are related and
are results of globalization, acting through a mechanism different from the
standard H-O one. The H-O mechanism is driven by the falling cost of moving
goods around the world, while these changes—we suggest—are driven by the
falling cost of moving know-how around the world. In particular, cheaper travel
and telecommunication have enabled highly-skilled workers who live in developed
countries to co-operate far more extensively in production with workers in
developing countries, through frequent short visits bridged by phone calls and
e-mails. This has raised the wages of highly-skilled workers, by expanding the
market for their services, and thus could explain the rise in inequality at the top
of the Northern wage distribution. Improved access to the services of highly-skilled
Northern workers has also raised the productivity of all workers in Southern
countries, and thus could explain the across-the-board rises in wages in those
countries.
1.1 Elaboration of the hypothesis
In later sections of the paper, we formalize this mechanism in a simple model
and subject it to empirical testing. In the rest of this introduction, we discuss the
mechanism more intuitively and explain how our model relates to various other
models.
Our ‘highly-skilled’ workers are a small subset of the much broader category
usually identified as ‘skilled’ on the basis of their education or training. They
are, rather, an elite of managers, entrepreneurs, designers, engineers, and other
business professionals, who often have high levels of education but whose
value to their employers stems mainly from their creativity, experience and
connections, acquired fortuitously from their genes, families, and careers. They
contribute to production partly by increasing the quantity of output, but
mainly by improving its quality and marketability. Specifically, what highly-skilled
workers know is how to produce state-of-the-art goods and services and to
sell them in any market in the world against competition from other such goods
and services.
Some of these goods and services are skill-intensive, in the sense that
their production requires intensive use of other sorts of skilled workers—
pharmaceuticals and software, for example. Other state-of-the-art goods, however,
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are not—sports shoes, computer assembly, up-market beach resorts, and off-season
fruits and vegetables, for example.1 For analysing some aspects of globalization and
wage inequality, this variation in skill intensity is important (for H-O reasons),
but to provide a clear description of our mechanism, we will abstract from it and
focus on the distinction between all state-of-the-art items and the lower-quality
items which account for much of the South’s production and consumption.
Correspondingly, we abstract from all differences in levels of skill among workers
other than the distinction between our small highly-skilled elite and the rest,
to whom we will refer as ‘less-skilled’ workers (acknowledging, of course, that
this dividing line, like those between other skill groups, is in practice somewhat
arbitrary).
Most highly-skilled workers live in developed countries, because of
externalities—economies of clustering—of two sorts. One is that frequent contact
among such workers, face-to-face as well as by telecommunication, is vital for
the acquisition and maintenance of their skills. The other is that many of the
amenities valued by highly-skilled workers and their families can be supplied
only by clusters of highly-skilled workers. These forces explain the limited scale
of long-term expatriate employment in the South, both historically and currently:
the skills of the workers atrophy and become obsolete as a result of isolation;
and employers have to pay them more to compensate for the loss of Northern
amenities. The same forces explain why few highly-skilled workers choose to
migrate to the South, despite what might seem to be the prospect of higher earnings
there because of their greater scarcity.
Even though they choose to reside in the North, highly-skilled workers have
the option of business travel to the South—intermittent and brief visits that
are planned, followed up and supplemented by telecommunication—which can
enable them to render services there. But it is more expensive and less efficient
to provide services abroad than at the worker’s Northern base. This is partly
because of the direct expenses of travel and telecommunication (air fares,
hotel bills, and charges for phone calls, faxes, and e-mail messages). These direct
costs, however, are dwarfed by the opportunity costs of time wasted both
while travelling and while working in the South (for example, hanging about
in airports and dealing with problems that arise from differences in
institutions, culture, and language). Similarly, insofar as the co-operation is by
telecommunication rather than by travel, the main cost is the extra time
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 The role of highly-skilled Northern workers in such sectors in Southern countries is well-documented
in case studies. Hobday (1995) studies the evolution of the East Asian electronics industry.
Gereffi (1999) reviews the contribution of technical and marketing expertise by Northern buyers
to the production of apparel for export in Southern countries. Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) provide
a similar analysis of footwear. Dolan and Humphrey (2000) describe how African exporters of
fresh vegetables are guided in crop selection, growing techniques, packaging and marketing by UK
supermarkets and importers.
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involved in distance-work, as compared with doing the same thing on the spot.
Highly-skilled workers are thus a semi-mobile factor of production: their services
can be moved from one country to another, but only by incurring what we shall call
‘co-operation costs’.
Business travel by highly-skilled workers has a long history—think, for example,
of Mozart touring round the courts of Europe—but its scale has risen over time
and increased rapidly in the past few decades (for example, a more than three-fold
increase between 1980 and 2000 in the number of international business trips
by UK residents; Anderson, 2004). The reason, of course, is great improvements
in the quality and cost of transport and telecommunications, which have
made business travel much easier and cheaper, not least in terms of wasted time.
Co-operation costs have been reduced also by changes in policies and institutions
in both developed and developing countries, which have made it quicker and
more efficient to transact business abroad. These improvements have been widely
noted as a cause of increased international economic integration (e.g. Harris, 1995;
World Bank, 2003).
Nonetheless, the excess costs of working abroad remain substantial, so to
explain why it happens one must identify an offsetting gain. There are many
possible reasons why highly-skilled workers might find it worth their while to
render services in the South. But the reason on which we shall focus, which is
of particular relevance to the impact of globalization on wage inequalities, is that
less-skilled workers cost less in the South than they do in the North. The total cost
of production for certain activities may thus be lower in the South, even though
highly-skilled workers have to be paid more than in the North to induce them to
participate. The most obvious examples are goods produced in the South for
export to the North, but the same point applies to the production of goods
and services for sale in the Southern home market—even in a poor country,
there is some demand for state-of-the art items, and this rises steadily as the
country becomes richer.
Falling co-operation costs increase the number of activities in the South in which
it is worth paying highly-skilled workers from the North to participate. This raises
the demand for the services of highly-skilled workers, and so tends to pull up their
wages. However, it tends to lower the wages of less-skilled Northern workers,
by eroding their privileged access to production with highly-skilled workers
(which enables them to earn more than Southern workers with comparable
levels of skill). Conversely, it also tends to raise the wages of Southern workers
(all of whom we assume for simplicity to be less-skilled). The effect is thus to
reduce wage inequality between Southern and Northern less-skilled workers, but
to increase inequality in the North between highly-skilled and less-skilled workers.
This occurs fundamentally because know-how or tacit knowledge, unlike some
other sorts of knowledge, is not a public good: it is excludable (less-skilled workers
benefit from it only if highly-skilled workers choose to co-operate with them) and
it is rivalrous (more of it being deployed in the South is likely to mean less of it
being deployed in the North).
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1.2 Comparison with other models
Our hypothesis and the model in which we formalize it in later sections are related
to, but distinct from, various other important contributions to economic analysis.
The magnification of the wages of highly-skilled people by access to a wider market
was modelled in the seminal paper of Rosen (1981), later elaborated by Frank
and Cook (1995), and earlier articulated, as Rosen points out, by Marshall, who
wrote of the rise in income inequality caused by ‘the development of new facilities
for communication, by which men . . . are enabled to apply their constructive
or speculative genius to undertakings . . . extending over a wider area than ever
before’ (1920, book VI, ch.XII, } 11). Our explanation of the rise in the wages of
the highly-skilled is essentially similar, but we introduce a North-South dimension
and explain how the effects on the wages of less-skilled workers vary between
the North and the South.
The North-South dimension of our model is similar in some respects to
recent analyses of transnational companies (TNCs) which treat them as channels
through which know-how is transferred from one country to another, a process
which clearly involves a lot of travel and telecommunication by highly-skilled
workers (e.g. Markusen, 2001). Our model, however, is not limited to any one
institutional form of business organization. The involvement of highly-skilled
workers in Southern production can and does occur not only within TNCs
but also in the framework of long-term supply contracts and other arms-length
business relationships.2 Our model also highlights the costs of transferring
know-how from one country to another, which are overlooked in recent models
of TNCs (as noted by Harhoff, 1999).
Another related literature with a North-South dimension is that on the
fragmentation of production—splitting it up into stages of differing factor
intensity, which can be located more efficiently in different countries—and on
the role of business services in linking the fragments of international production
networks (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990; and the papers in Arndt and
Kierzkowski, 2001). There are some clear affinities with our model, since we too
stress the role of highly-skilled workers in cross-border quality control and
co-operation—and in this regard there are affinities also with recent analyses of
international business networks (e.g. Rauch and Casella, 2003). However, our
model is not limited to fragmented production or outsourcing: it applies to
North-South trade in parts and components, but also to integrated production
of goods and services in both regions, either for export or for domestic sale.
At a more formal level, there is a similarity between our model and another
class of North-South models in which all capital is owned by Northern residents
but can be shifted from the North to the more capital-scarce South, which raises
the returns to capital and the wages of Southern workers, but lowers the wages of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 As is illustrated by the evidence on apparel, footwear and fresh vegetables cited in footnote 1.
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Northern workers (e.g. Sachs and Shatz, 1996). These distributional outcomes,
resulting from the North-South shift of a semi-mobile factor, are essentially
the same as in our model. The difference, of course, is that in our model it is
highly-skilled labour rather than capital which is the semi-mobile factor, and
that we have a more fully specified explanation of what induces it to shift from
the North to the South.
A further difference between our model and the other North-South models
mentioned above is the distinction we make between state-of-the-art and backward
goods. In this respect our model is related to that of Murphy and Shleifer (1997),
which revolves around differences in the quality of goods produced in countries
at different levels of development. It has a more general affinity, too, with the
many studies which emphasize technological dualism within developing countries.
It also bears a resemblance to product cycle models such as Krugman (1979),
in which Northern workers earn more than Southern workers because new
goods can be produced only in the North. A difference, though, is that in
Krugman’s model there is just one class of Northern workers, whereas in our
model the North’s monopoly of the ability to produce new goods is linked to its
supply of highly-skilled workers.
The distinction between advanced and backward goods also differentiates our
analysis from the standard H-O model in which it is assumed that the South could
produce all goods in autarky (an assumption often criticized by development
economists). In our model, Southern production of state-of-the-art goods
depends on the expertise of highly-skilled workers from the North. Moreover,
in the standard H-O model, changes in wage inequalities are driven by reduction
of the cost of moving goods between North and South, whereas the driver in our
model is reduction of the costs of moving know-how.
Our model is similar in some ways to the specific-factors trade model, in
that highly-skilled workers are needed for the production only of state-of-the-art
goods, while other sorts of workers are needed in both sectors and can move
freely between them. Some of its results also resemble those of a specific-factors
model: for example, a rise in the relative world price of state-of-the-art goods
raises the wages of highly-skilled workers but has mixed effects on the wages
of other workers.3 In the standard specific-factors model, however, factors are
immobile between countries, whereas we allow a specific factor (highly-skilled
labour) to be mobile—at a cost—between the North and the South, and we
focus on the consequences for wages of changes in the cost of its international
mobility.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Tending to raise them in the North and lower them in the South. The endogeneity of world commodity
prices in our model—the North and the South are not ‘small countries’—complicates comparison
with results from standard specific-factors models (e.g. Markusen et al., 1995, pp. 127–41)
which permit (a) changes of country endowments at constant commodity prices and (b) exogenous
changes in world prices.
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In the next two sections of the paper, we show how the mechanism discussed
above in general terms can be formalized algebraically (and illustrated with a
diagram). Section 2 sets out a model of the determination of wages at a given
level of co-operation costs, which is then used in Section 3 to analyse the effects
of falling co-operation costs on wage inequalities. The following two sections
explore the mechanism empirically. Section 4 examines the effects of increasing
international business travel on wage inequality within the North, using data from
the United States. Section 5 examines the effects of co-operation costs on wage
inequality between North and South, using data on a cross-section of countries.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Equilibrium with given co-operation costs
There are two countries, North (N) and South (S), and two skill categories of
workers, both in fixed supply: highly-skilled workers, whose number is denoted
by K (for know-how); and other workers, whose number is denoted by L
(for labour). L-workers are divided in fixed proportions between the North and
the South,
L ¼ LN þ LS; ð1Þ
and can work only in the countries where they live. All K-workers live (and
consume) in the North, but can work both in the North and in the South.
K-work in the South entails co-operation costs, consisting of wasted K-worker
time, which is a fraction t (0) of effective working time (the ‘iceberg’ principle),
so that
K ¼ KN þ 1 þ tð ÞKS ð2Þ
where KS is effective working time in the South. In this section, we treat the value
of t (which stands for travel and telecommunication costs) as a parameter.
There are two goods, a state-of-the-art one (labelled A for advanced) and
a lower-quality one (labelled B for basic). Production of the B-good requires
only L-workers, with a technology such that one unit of L-work produces
one unit of B-output. Production of the A-good requires K-workers as
well as L-workers, with a constant-returns-to-scale technology, Q=Lf(k),
where k is K/L and f 040, f 0050. As in a specific-factors model, K-workers are
used in only one sector, while L-workers are used in both sectors and mobile
between them.
Both goods can be traded between the two countries. In order to isolate the
effects of co-operation costs, we assume transport costs (and other barriers to
trade) to be zero, so that the prices of the two goods, pA and pB, are the same in
both countries.
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2.1 Alternative equilibria
Our analysis will focus on one specific type of equilibrium, in which the North
is completely specialized in production of the A-good, while the South produces
both the A-good and the B-good. This type of equilibrium seems consistent with
the world as we observe it today—with North-based experts overseeing enclaves
of modern production in a largely traditional South—but the structure of the
model as outlined above could permit other types of equilibria, which merit
brief consideration here (a fuller technical exposition is available on request).
With all K-workers living in the North, the combination of positive co-operation
costs and zero transport costs implies that any equilibrium must involve
complete specialization in at least one country. For if co-operation costs are
positive, K-work in the South (needed for it to produce the A-good) must cost
more than in the North, and hence both countries could not profitably produce
both goods at the same prices.
In one alternative equilibrium, the South would be specialized in production
of the B-good, while the North produced both goods (corresponding perhaps to an
earlier phase of history in which modernization was in progress in the North and
had not started in the South). What puts the world into our type of equilibrium
rather than this symmetrical alternative is a combination of three things: a
North which is small relative to the South (in terms of its stock of L-workers);
a strong consumer preference for the A-good over the B-good; and a relatively
large global supply of K-workers, compared to L-workers (which tends to attract
L-workers into the A-sector by making them more productive there).4 All three
of these things make it more likely that the whole of the North’s production
capacity will be used to meet the world’s demand for the A-good, as in the case
on which we focus.
Even if, for these reasons, the North is specialized in A-production, the
South need not produce both sorts of goods, as it does in our case. The level
of co-operation costs, t, might be too high for Northern K-workers to find it
worthwhile to provide any services in the South—yielding an equilibrium in
which each country was specialized in one of the two goods. For work in the
South to be attractive to K-workers, putting the world into our type of equilibrium
rather than this fully specialized alternative, the gap in wages between Northern and
Southern L-workers must be big enough to outweigh the costs of co-operation.
This gap is made bigger by the same three things as in the previous paragraph.
Both a larger supply of K-workers and a smaller Northern labour force tend to
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 A larger global supply of K-workers relative to L-workers also pulls in the other direction by increasing
the supply of the A-good and thus reducing its relative price, which tends to makes the A-sector less
attractive to L-workers by lowering their marginal revenue product there. However, this contrary effect
will be dominated by the effect mentioned in the text if, as is argued later in this paper, the elasticity
of substitution in consumption between A- and B-goods is larger than the elasticity of substitution in
A-production between K- and L-workers.
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raise the wages of Northern L-workers.5 Stronger consumer preferences for
the A-good tend to raise its relative price, and hence to lower the wages of
Southern L-workers (which are linked to the price of the B-good). At present,
the North-South wage gap is apparently big enough to make co-operation
attractive to K-workers, permitting the South to produce both goods. Thus
in our type of equilibrium, world output of the B-good, with its labour-only
production technology, is simply
QB ¼ LS  LAS; ð3Þ
where LAS is the part of the Southern labour force that works in the A-sector. World
output of the A-good is
QA ¼ LNf kNð Þ þ LASf kSð Þ; ð4Þ
where kN¼KN/LN and kS¼KS/LAS.
2.2 Determination of wages
Product and labour markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, so that
the wages of all categories of workers are equal to their marginal value products.
The wage of highly-skilled workers, wKN , relative to that of other Northern workers,





f kNð Þ  f 0 kNð ÞkN
ð5Þ
where f 0(kN) is the marginal physical product of K-workers and f(kN) f 0(kN)kN
that of Northern L-workers. This wage ratio, which we assume always to be greater
than unity, is decreasing in kN (because f
0050), and hence, since LN is given, in KN.
Greater concentration of K-work in the North reduces wage inequality within the
North by making K-workers less scarce there, relative to L-workers.
The wage of Northern L-workers relative to that of Southern L-workers, wLS ,




¼ f kNð Þ  f
0 kNð ÞkN
f kSð Þ  f 0 kSð ÞkS ð6Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5 A larger supply of K-workers also pulls in the other direction by lowering the relative price of the
A-good, but on the assumptions about elasticities mentioned in footnote 4, its net effect is to widen the
wage gap.
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which depends on the sizes of kN and of kS. In particular, if kN > kS, this wage
ratio will be greater than unity (that is, Northern L-workers will earn more than
Southern L-workers). This is always the case in the type of equilibrium on which we
focus.
Relative wages in our model thus depend proximately on kN and kS, which in
turn are determined, together with two other variables (Southern employment in
the A-sector, LAS, and the relative goods price, pA/pB), by a set of four equations.
The first,
f 0 kNð Þ ¼ 1
1 þ t f
0 kSð Þ; ð7Þ
is an arbitrage condition for K-workers, whose wage in the North (the left-hand
side) must in equilibrium be equal to the wage they can earn in the South, net of
wasted time. The second equation,
pA f kSð Þ  f 0 kSð ÞkS
  ¼ pB; ð8Þ
is an arbitrage condition for Southern L-workers, who are mobile across sectors and
so in equilibrium must earn the same wage in A-production (the left-hand side) as
in B-production (the right-hand side, which is simply pB because each unit of
labour produces one unit of output). There is thus a fixed, inverse, relationship
between the relative price of the two goods and the value of kS. If pA/pB remains
constant, so must kS, and a fall (say) in pA/pB would require a rise in kS, to
increase the marginal physical productivity of A-work relative to B-work.
The third equation is the full-employment condition for highly-skilled labour,
K ¼ KN þ 1 þ tð ÞKS ¼ LNkN þ ð1 þ tÞLASkS; ð2aÞ
and the fourth equation is a demand function. For simplicity, we assume all work-
ers to have identical homothetic preferences and that, given world (North plus







where " is a constant substitution elasticity. In reality, the demand for state-of-the-
art goods is income-elastic, so that the lower-quality B-good is likely to be con-
sumed more in the South and by L-workers than in the North and by K-workers.
To introduce income elasticity into the demand function would unduly complicate
the model, but a simpler modification along these lines would be to assume that the
B-good is consumed only in the South.
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The key features of the model are illustrated in Fig. 1 (a more formal analysis
is available on request). This type of figure, attributed to Mussa (1974), is often
used to analyse the effects of factor mobility, both between countries and (in
specific-factors models) between sectors. Its horizontal axis shows the division of
K-work between the North (measured from the left) and the South (measured from
the right), with the segment in the middle, between KN and KS, being time wasted
on co-operation costs (¼tKS). The lines N and S trace the relationships, in the
North and the South respectively, between the marginal physical product of K-work
and the amount of K-work done in the region. The line S/(1þ t) traces the relation-
ship between KS and the return to K-work in the South, which is its marginal
product there, net of co-operation costs (so that this line is a constant proportional
distance below S).6 The horizontal broken line through S/(1þ t) is the K-worker
arbitrage condition, by which the return to K-work in the South must equal the
wage of K-workers in the North.
The line N is derived from the A-sector production function, given the fixed
number of Northern L-workers: its slope is steeper, the lower is the elasticity
of substitution () between K-work and L-work. The line S, however, since
the number of L-workers in the Southern A-sector is not fixed, is a composite
relationship, derived from the Southern L-worker arbitrage condition and the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
6 The value of the co-operation cost parameter, t, determines two features of the figure—horizontally,
the ratio of wasted time to effective Southern K-work (tKS /KS¼ t), and vertically, the proportional
distance between the gross and net S curves: (S S/(1þ t))/(S/(1þ t))¼ t.
KN KS
N S
















Fig. 1. Equilibrium with given co-operation costs
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demand function. More specifically, the marginal product of Southern K-work
depends proximately on kS, which in turn depends, via the L-worker arbitrage
condition, on pA/pB. The relative price pA/pB depends, via the demand function,
on the relative outputs of the A-good and the B-good, QA/QB. This quantity ratio
rises with KS because a greater supply of K-work in the South draws more
Southern L-workers out of B-production. In short, as KS rises, so does LAS and
QA/QB, which lowers pA/pB, raises kS, and thus lowers the marginal product of
Southern K-work.
The slope of the line S evidently depends on the values of several parameters,
but one important determinant is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, ".
The larger the value of this parameter, the shallower is the slope of the line. If " were
infinite, for example, pA/pB would not change, whatever happened to QA/QB, and
so nor would kS or the marginal product of Southern K-work, making S horizontal.
If " were small, by contrast, S would be steeply sloped, possibly more so than N.
However, Fig. 1 is drawn to show S shallower than N, on the basis of what
seems to be the most plausible combination of parameter values. Because lower-
quality goods are reasonable substitutes for state-of-the-art goods, at least in
the South, which is the main and perhaps the only market for B-goods, " is
likely to be fairly high. But  (which determines the slope of N) is likely to
be low: other workers are poor substitutes for K-workers in the production of
A-goods, because they lack the know-how needed to create, produce and market
state-of-the-art goods.
3. Effects of falling co-operation costs
The results of a fall in co-operation costs are not entirely straightforward, because it
has two different and potentially offsetting effects. The more obvious, and usually
the dominant one, is a ‘substitution’ effect, whereby the reduction in the amount
of time wasted increases the attractiveness of working in the South to K-workers,
who therefore do more work there, and less in the North. But there is also an
‘efficiency’ effect: lower co-operation costs tend to raise the effective world supply
of K-workers (KSþKN), by reducing the amount of time they waste, tKS. So more
K-work in the South need not imply less K-work in the North.7
Because these two effects conflict, a fall in co-operation costs could either
increase or decrease wage inequality in the North between K-workers and
L-workers (a formal analysis is available on request). The direction of the outcome
depends proximately on what happens to kN. If the substitution effect dominates,




N rises (an increase in inequality). But if the efficiency
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 The efficiency effect is relevant only if the initial equilibrium involved some Southern A-production.
If the fall in co-operation costs were from a prohibitive level to a permissive level (initiating Southern
A-production), only the substitution effect would matter, and wage inequality within the North would
necessarily increase.
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effect were to pull strongly in the opposite direction, so that the reduced waste of
K-worker time led to a rise in K-work both in the South and in the North, kN would
rise and wKN=w
L
N would fall. Such an outcome would require, however, not just a
rise in the effective world supply of K-work, but also a world average elasticity
of demand for K-work below unity, taking into account both substitution between
K-workers and L-workers within the A-sector and substitution between the A-good
and the B-good.
Figure 2 shows how a reduction in t tends to cause the line S/(1þ t) to shift
upwards: a fall in co-operation costs raises the return to K-work in the South, given
its marginal product there. This upward shift (which occurs despite a partially
offsetting downward shift in the line S)8 raises the net return to Southern
K-work and thus the wage of K-workers. However, the Northern K-wage rises by
less than the upward shift of S/(1þ t), because the increased supply of K-work to
the South causes downward movement along S/(1þ t), to an extent dependent on
the slope of the curve.
For reasons mentioned above, we have drawn S with a relatively shallow slope.
The outcome is thus that wKN rises as a result of the fall in t, which entails also a fall
in KN and hence (given LN) in kN, so that wage inequality in the North is increased.





S / (1 + t)
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Fig. 2. Effects of reduction of co-operation costs
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 S shifts downward because the initial effects of lower co-operation costs are to raise production of the
A-good, lower its relative price and induce more Southern workers to work in the B-sector. Given KS,
the marginal product of K-work in the South therefore falls.
e. anderson, p. j. g. tang, and a. wood 581
position fixed, this outcome would be guaranteed (because, with no change in
pA/pB and hence in kS, it is clear from the K-worker arbitrage condition that a
fall in t would raise wKN and lower kN). The figure also shows, though, that the
outcome could be in the opposite direction: if S/(1þ t) were steeply sloped and did
not shift upwards much, because " was low, the net return to K-work in the South
would fall, and with it the wage of K-workers in the North, both absolutely and
relative to Northern L-workers (because KN and kN would rise).
Turning to wage inequality between Northern and Southern L-workers,
the impact of a fall in co-operation costs can be inferred straightforwardly from
inspection of the K-worker arbitrage condition (eq. (7)). A reduction in the value
of t evidently lowers the ratio (>1) of the marginal productivity of K-work in
the South to the marginal productivity of K-work in the North. It must thus
correspondingly raise the ratio (51) of the marginal productivity of L-work
(in the A-sector) in the South to the marginal productivity of L-work in the
North (since the production function and the price of the A-good are the same
in both regions). Since it is this marginal productivity ratio which governs the
relative wages of Northern and Southern L-workers (eq. (6)), wage inequality
between these two groups is bound to fall.
In addition to reducing the relative wage advantage of Northern L-workers over
Southern L-workers, reduction of co-operation costs must raise the absolute real
wage of Southern L-workers, since their wage in terms of the B-good does not alter,
and the relative price of the B-good rises. In general, moreover, the absolute real
wage of Northern L-workers is reduced. This is because the decline in kN reduces
their marginal physical productivity and hence their wage in terms of their own
product, with the decline in their consumption wage being reinforced by the fall
in the price of their own product (the A-good) relative to the B-good. Even in the
unusual case in which kN rises, the real consumption wage of Northern L-workers
is likely to decline as a result of the relative price change (which tends to be large
in this case).
Although our focus is on falling co-operation costs, it is of interest also to
consider the impact of a rise in LS /LN as a result of faster Southern population
growth. One effect is to raise wLN=w
L
S , pulling in the opposite direction to falling
co-operation costs. This happens because the increased supply of Southern labour
raises output of the B-good, driving down its relative price and hence encouraging
Southern L-workers to move into the A-sector, where their increased numbers,
given the supply of K-work to the South, lower kS and the marginal productivity
of Southern L-work, relative to that of Northern L-work. This tendency is damped,
however, by an expanded supply of K-work to the South, induced by the fall in kS
(which raises the marginal productivity of Southern K-work, relative to Northern
K-work). The supply of K-work to the North is thus reduced, and so kN falls,
increasing wage inequality in the North, which reinforces the (usual) effect of
falling co-operation costs.
To summarize, our theoretical model predicts that a fall in co-operation costs
will have two effects on wage inequalities. It will usually tend to widen the wage gap
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within developed countries between highly-skilled and less-skilled workers,
and it will tend to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries
in the wages of less-skilled workers. The rest of the paper is devoted to testing these
predictions.
4. Empirical evidence: wage inequality in the North
In this section we estimate the contribution of increasing international business
travel and communication to rising wage inequality in one large Northern country,
the United States. We first show that both the amount of business travel to
developing countries and the relative earnings of international business travellers
rose during the 1990s. We then show that, on plausible assumptions, this rise
in travel can account for a substantial fraction of the observed increase in inequality
in the upper half of the US income distribution.
4.1 Amount of international business travel
Information on outgoing international business travel from the United States
between 1986 and 1997 is shown in Table 1. The source is the International Air
Passenger Survey (IAPS), a monthly survey of travel to and from the United States,
carried out by a branch of the US Department of Commerce.9 Three series are
shown: the total number of international business travellers, the average amount of
time spent outside the US on each international business trip, and the proportion
of countries visited which were in the South (non-OECD). An estimate of the total
amount of time spent by business travellers in Southern countries can be obtained
by multiplying these three series together, assuming that each traveller makes just
one trip during the year and that trips to non-OECD destinations are of similar
duration to those to OECD countries. (The IAPS does not contain information on
the average number of international business trips per year made by international
business travellers.10 Nor does it contain separate data on the average amount of
time spent in OECD and non-OECD destinations.)
..........................................................................................................................................................................
9 Although the IAPS has been carried out since the early 1980s, we show data for 1986, 1990 and 1997
only. The reason is that data from the IAPS, other than the most basic, must be purchased.
10 Separate evidence from the American Travel Survey (ATS), a survey of approximately 80,000 US
households carried out by the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, suggests that US residents made
approximately 6.6 million international business trips in 1995 (see Anderson, 2002). The similarity
between this figure and the IAPS estimate of the number of international business travellers in 1997
suggests that the average number of international business trips per international business traveller was
close to unity in those years. It may have been higher in earlier years, in which case the results in Table 1
would overestimate the rise in the amount of international business travel over the period, but this
seems unlikely: evidence from the IAPS (not shown) shows that the average number of all international
trips (including pleasure as well as business trips) made per year by international business travellers rose
from 4.4 in 1990 to 5.7 in 1997. If the average number of international business trips per traveller in fact
rose over the period, our results would underestimate the rise in the amount of international business
travel, and its contribution to the rise in US wage inequality.
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The number of international business travellers rose by two-thirds between 1986
and 1997. There was also an increase in the proportion of visits to Southern
countries between 1990 and 1997, but a fall in the average amount of time spent
outside the US per business trip, both in 1986–90 and in 1990–97. The estimated
total amount of time spent on business trips to Southern countries rose only
slightly between 1986 and 1990, but increased by nearly 50% between 1990
and 1997.
It is possible that the data in Table 1 over-estimate the total amount of
time supplied by US K-workers to the South, because they include travel to buy
and sell goods without significant co-operation in production or marketing. We
do not have information on the precise reasons why people travel on business,
but information on the occupations of travellers is consistent with a high level
of technical and managerial input, as distinct from simply buying or selling.
In the 1997 International Air Passenger Survey, for example, 40% of overseas
business travellers from the US classify their jobs as ‘professional/technical’,
and 51% as ‘managerial/executive’, while less than 2% classify themselves as
‘clerical/sales’. We also know from the American Travel Survey that in 1995 only
5% of all business trips were to sales conventions (Anderson, 2002).11
It is more likely that the data on travel in Table 1 greatly underestimate the total
amount of time supplied by US K-workers to the South. They omit time supplied
via telecommunication, as well as time spent on preparation for and follow-up to
Southern travel and telecommunication by both travellers and other K-workers.
To allow roughly for this underestimation we assume that for travellers time spent
abroad is a quarter of the total time they spend on South-related activities and that
Table 1 International business travel from the United States, 1986–97
1986 1990 1997
International business travellers (000) 4,813 5,597 7,924
Nights spent outside the US (mean per trip) 16.3 14.9 12.5
Non-OECD countries visited (% of total countries visited) 50.9 49.9 61.5
Nights spent in non-OECD countries on business trips (000) 39,932 41,614 60,916
—equivalent workers (000) 160 166 244
—proportion of US employment (%) 0.15 0.14 0.19
Notes: International business travellers are US residents who make at least one trip by air during the year
to a foreign country for either business or convention purposes. The number of equivalent workers is
obtained by dividing the total number of nights by 250 (a rough estimate of the average number of
working days in a year).
Source: IAPS.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 The case-study evidence cited in footnote 1 tends to confirm that much of the travel connected with
trade in types of goods that account for a high share of Southern exports has a co-operative purpose—as
is true also for Northern exports of components for use in production of Southern exports.
584 globalization
non-travelling K-workers contribute as much time as travellers. The total amount
of time supplied to Southern countries by US K-workers is thus assumed to be
eight times that spent on travel to the South, implying that it grew from 1.3 million
worker-years in 1986 to 1.9 million in 1997, or from 1.2% to 1.5% of total US
employment. The proportional rise may still be underestimated, since
advances in information and communication technologies probably raised
the ratio of the total amount of time spent on South-related activities to time
spent travelling.
4.2 Relative wages of international business travellers
Table 2 shows estimates of the relative wages of international business travellers.
It compares their mean household income (the only income measure collected
by the IAPS) with the mean income of all US households, obtained from the
March Current Population Survey (CPS) of the US Bureau of the Census.
We control for differences in age by comparing the travellers with all households
whose householder is in the same age group, and show figures separately for
three age groups: 25–34, 35–44, and 45–54. The mean household incomes of
international business travellers in all age groups are roughly double those of
all households, and in all age groups the size of this income differential rose
between 1986 and 1997.
There are of course many possible reasons why the household incomes of
international business travellers are higher than those of other households. The
results in Table 2 do not control for any differences between international business
travellers and the US population in household composition. Nor do they control
Table 2 Incomes of business travellers in the United States, 1986–97 ($000)
1986 1990 1997
Ages 25–34
International business travellers 57.0 73.8 97.6
All households 29.3 34.5 45.1
–ratio 1.95 2.14 2.16
Ages 35–44
International business travellers 75.1 97.4 135.6
All households 37.7 45.1 57.0
–ratio 1.99 2.16 2.38
Ages 45–54
International business travellers 84.2 108.0 158.8
All households 41.1 50.0 65.3
–ratio 2.05 2.16 2.43
Notes: The results are based on an adjustment factor of 1.5 for top-coded incomes in the IAPS.
The top-coded income group is $70,000 and above in 1986 (48% of travellers), $110,000 and above
in 1990 (31% of travellers), and $200,000 and above in 1997 (20% of travellers).
Source: IAPS.
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for the fact that business travellers typically have higher levels of education
and experience than other workers. However, results in Anderson (2002), based
on more detailed household survey data for a single year (1995), show that the
incomes of international business travellers remain significantly higher even
after controlling for household composition, education, experience and other
demographic characteristics (and that this differential is unlikely to reflect simply
compensation for the disutility of travel).
4.3 Impact on US wage inequality
To quantify the effect on wage inequality of the estimated increase in time supplied
by US K-workers to the South, we use eq. (5)—the inverse relationship between
the wage of K-workers relative to Northern L-workers (wKN=w
L
N) and the Northern
supply of K-work relative to L-work (kN). This relationship depends on the
elasticity of substitution between K-work and L-work (), about whose size it is
necessary to make some assumption. To perform the relevant calculation, it is
also necessary to make an assumption about the share of K-workers in the
Northern labour force, K/(Kþ LN)K/E. This is because our data cover
only K-work on the South and omit K-work on the North (which is probably
the large majority).
Given a value for , we can derive kN from our estimate of the amount of K-work
on the South as
kN ¼ KN
LN
¼ K  KSð1 þ tÞ
E  K ¼
 S
1   ; ð10Þ
where SKS(1þ t)/E. Similarly, given that the average wage of all Northern
workers (wE) can be written as
wE ¼ wK þ 1  ð ÞwL; ð11Þ
we can derive the wage of all K-workers relative to Northern L-workers from our
data on the wage of international business travellers, wT, as
wK
wL
¼ wT  wT
wE  wT ; ð12Þ
assuming that all international business travellers are K-workers, so that wT¼wK.
Panel A of Table 3, based on equations (10) and (12) and the data in Tables 1
and 2, shows the changes in the relative supply of K-workers (kN) and the relative
wage of K-workers (wKN=w
L
N) in the US under three alternative assumptions
about the value of . Thus for instance, if K-workers were 10% of the Northern
labour force (¼ 0.1), the estimated rise in S (K-work on the South as a share of
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total US employment) from 1.2% to 1.5% between 1986 and 1997 would have
caused kN to fall by 0.4% per year. Over the same period, the rise of 5.5% per year
in wT and 3.8% per year in wE (using the values for the 35–44 age group) would
have translated into a rise of 2.1% per year in wKN=w
L
N . If  were assumed to be




N smaller, and vice versa.
If  were assumed to have risen over the period, the rate of decline in kN would be
smaller and the rise in wKN=w
L
N would be larger.
Panel B of Table 3, based on eq. (5), shows the percentage of the inferred rise in
wKN=w
L
N which is explained by the inferred fall in kN. Separate estimates are
shown for our alternative assumptions about  and for three alternative assumed
values of  (0.5, 1 and 2). For instance, if ¼ 0.1 and  = 1, the decline of 0.4% per
year in kN during 1986-97 would have contributed 0.4% per year of the overall
2.1% per year inferred rise in wKN=w
L
N during that period, a share of 17% (adjusted
for rounding errors). Larger assumed values of  and  make these shares smaller,
and vice versa. On our best guesses of the values, which are ¼ 0.1 and ¼ 0.5,
the increase in Southern K-work would explain 34% of the rise in wage
inequality between K-workers and L-workers during 1986–97 and 71% of it
during 1990–7.
The results in Table 3 can be used to estimate the contribution of the rise in
Southern K-work to the increase in overall inequality in the US. According to the
US Census Bureau, the ratio of mean household income in the top household
quintile to that in the middle quintile rose from 2.93 in 1990 to 3.30 in 1997.
Assuming all K-workers to be in the top quintile, our best guesses of the values of
 (0.1) and  (0.5) imply that about one-third of this increase in inequality
could be explained by the increasing share of their time that US K-workers spent
Table 3 Impact on US wage inequality
1990–97 1986–97














0.05 1.5 1.6 0.8 1.8
0.1 0.6 1.8 0.4 2.1
0.2 0.3 2.6 0.2 2.9









 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2
0.05 191 95 48 93 46 23
0.1 71 35 18 34 17 9
0.2 23 12 6 12 6 3
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on co-operation with Southern rather than Northern L-workers.12 This number
could be made larger or smaller by altering the various assumptions on which it is
based, but it suggests to us that falling co-operation costs may well account for
a substantial proportion of the recent rise in upper-tail wage inequality both in the
US and in other developed countries.
5. Empirical evidence: North-South wage inequality
Lack of suitable data precludes a time-series test of the prediction that increasing
co-operation between K-workers and Southern L-workers narrows the gap in wages
between Northern and Southern L-workers. Instead, we do a cross-section test,
treating the South not as one country (as in our basic model) but, more
realistically, as many different countries. Our hypothesis is that Southern countries
where co-operation costs are lower tend to have higher wages. We test this
hypothesis in two stages, first asking whether lower co-operation costs are
associated with larger amounts of inward business travel and then asking whether
more inward business travel is associated with higher wages. Both stages of the
test support the hypothesis.
5.1 Method
Equation (6) implies that the wage of L-workers in any one Southern country i
relative to the L-worker wage in the North (denoting this ratio by wLi ) is a positive
function of the effective amount of K-worker time supplied to that country, relative
to L-worker employment in the A-sector (ki¼KSi/LASi). The wage in the Southern
country will of course depend also on other things, so we can rewrite the equation
for purposes of estimation as
ln wLi
  ¼ þ lnki þ  zi þ i; ð13Þ
where zi is a set of other observed influences on w
L
i , and i includes unobserved
influences. Eq. (7), the K-worker arbitrage condition, in turn implies that ki is a
negative function of the level of co-operation costs in the country concerned (ti),
and can be rewritten as
ln kið Þ ¼  ti þ "i; ð14Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12 The decline in kN caused by the rise in Southern K-work accounts for 71% of the 1.8% p.a. rise in
wKN=w
L
N , i.e 1.3% p.a. Given ¼ 0.1, we assume that K-workers make up half of the top income quintile,
Q1, and that the average income of L-workers is close to the average of the middle quintile, Q3, so that
this relative wage rise can explain 0.6% p.a. (half of 1.3%) or about one third of the overall 1.7% p.a. rise
of the Q1/Q3 income ratio.
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where ti is a set of proxy measures of co-operation costs in Southern country i,
and "i includes unobserved influences on ki plus any short-term deviations
from arbitrage.
Our approach is first to estimate eq. (14) using the widest available set of proxies
for co-operation costs and suitable instruments, and then to use the predicted
values from this regression as an instrument for ki in eq. (13). This avoids the
problem (with ordinary least squares) of potential correlation between ki and i.
It also allows us to separate out the effects of variables which affect wages both via
their effect on ki and via other channels. The approach requires that at least some
of the proxies for co-operation costs affect wages only through their effect on ki,
and can therefore be excluded from the set of variables zi.
5.2 Data
We use four proxies for co-operation costs in each country: the quality of its
institutions, as measured by the rule of law index of Kaufmann et al. (2003); its
minimum distance from the US, EU, or Japan; the minimum time difference
between it and the US, EU, or Japan; and the proportion of its population speaking
a Western European language. All are likely to affect the costs of business travel and
communication between that country and the North. In addition, geographical
distance, time difference and language spoken can reasonably be assumed to be
unaffected by any unobserved shocks to wages and productivity, while valid
instruments are available for institutional quality: either a country’s distance
from the equator (used by Hall and Jones, 1999) or the mortality rate of early
European settlers (as in Acemoglu et al., 2001).
Both the quality of a country’s institutions and its distance from the EU, Japan,
or US are likely to affect wages and productivity through various channels, of which
their effect on inflows of K-workers from abroad is only one, and must therefore
also be included in the set of control variables zi. However, after controlling for
geographical distances, one can plausibly assume that time differences from the EU,
US, or Japan have no other effects on wages and productivity. Similarly, once we
control for institutional quality, with which it will be correlated, it is plausible to
assume that the proportion of the population speaking a European language has
no other effects on wages and productivity. These latter variables can therefore be
excluded from zi.
The proportion of the population speaking a European language has been used
by others as an instrument for institutional quality (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999;
Rodrik et al., 2004). The reasoning is that countries favoured by Europeans for
colonization during the 18th and 19th centuries—which as a result have larger
fractions of their populations speaking a European language today—were also
those in which Europeans had most incentive to establish high-quality institutions.
Although this may account for the correlation between language and
institutional quality, the former would not be an appropriate instrument for
e. anderson, p. j. g. tang, and a. wood 589
the latter if language affected wages and productivity directly, through its impact
on inflows of business travel and communication.
We measure ki from data on the number of incoming business and professional
visits, published by the World Tourism Organization (2000). A business trip is
defined as a visit by a foreign national for the purpose of business or attending
a convention/conference, where the intention is to stay no longer than a month.
We convert the data on visits into the number of equivalent workers, by dividing
the number of incoming business visits by 25 (assuming the average length of a
business trip to be ten working days and 250 working days in an average working
year). This total is then expressed as a proportion of the population of the
Southern country.13 GNP per capita, measured at official market exchange rates,
is used as a proxy for wi. Table 4 provides acronyms and summary statistics for
all these variables.
There is a significant positive correlation between the amount of inward business
travel developing countries receive (measured by World Tourism Organization
data) and the amount of net foreign direct investment they receive (measured
from balance of payments statistics).14 That there should be such a correlation is
..........................................................................................................................................................................
13 The limitations of these data are discussed in more detail in Anderson (2004). The most serious
concern is that they do not include K-worker services supplied via telecommunication, causing the
estimated value of  to be biased downward. However, there are a priori grounds for thinking that this
bias will be small, most notably because there seems to be little substitution between travel and tele-
communication (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998).
14 With both variables divided by population and logged, the correlation (R2) is 0.45 for the larger
sample used in our paper and 0.39 for the smaller sample.
Table 4 Intra-South wage inequality: list of variables
Variable name Variable description Mean Std. dev.
PCY Log GNP per capita, US$ in 1996 7.093 1.452
DIST Minimum distance from New York, London
or Tokyo (km), log
8.492 0.416
LANG Proportion of population speaking English, French,
German, Spanish or Portuguese
0.366 0.425
TIME Minimum time difference with New York, London
or Tokyo (hours)
1.343 1.194
INST Rule of law index in 1998 constructed by
Kaufmann et al. (2003) (z-score)
0.253 0.864
KL Incoming business travel, log person-years per
million inhabitants, 1995 or closest year
4.938 2.020
POP Population in 1996, log 16.329 1.553
AREA Land area, log 16.921 2.120
DEQTR Distance from the equator, 0–1 scale 0.162 0.112
SMR European settler mortality per thousand, log 4.606 1.171
Notes: Descriptive statistics are calculated from the sample of countries for which data on settler
mortality rates are available, as well as all other variables (n¼ 51).
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consistent with our model, because transnational companies are an important
institutional device for co-operation (albeit by no means the only device, as was
explained in Section 1). What would be irrelevant to our model would be travel
within transnationals which had invested overseas for reasons other than gains
from co-operative production, such as a scarcity of physical or financial capital
in the host country. Case study evidence and casual observation suggest that this is
rare, not only for manufacturing but also for, say, mining, which usually relies on
frequent inputs of know-how from people from headquarters.
5.3 Results
Table 5 shows the results for all non-G7 countries with populations exceeding
100,000 for which there are data on all four proxies for co-operation costs.
Two alternative instruments for institutional quality are used: columns (1) and
(2) are based on DEQTR, while columns (3) and (4) are based on SMR (which
greatly reduces the sample size). What are shown in each column are standardized
beta coefficients, permitting the effects of different explanatory variables to be
compared in size.
The results of the first stage of the test, where the dependent variable is KL and
the explanatory variables are LANG, TIME, DIST, and INST, are in columns (1)
and (3). DIST and TIME both have negative effects on KL, while INST has a
Table 5 Intra-South wage inequality: IV regression results
1 2 3 4
Dependent variable: KL PCY KL PCY
Instrument for INST: DEQTR DEQTR SMR SMR
DIST 0.143 0.016 0.067 0.022
0.07 0.90 0.65 0.88
LANG 0.110 – 0.076 –
0.20 0.51
TIME 0.191 – 0.275 –
0.02 0.04
INST 0.723 0.702 0.613 0.551
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08
KL – 0.477 – 0.974
0.28 0.04
R2 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.65
Number of countries 77 77 49 49
Notes: p-values, calculated using standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, are shown below each
coefficient. All regressions satisfy the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (do not reject the null hypothesis that
the residuals are normally distributed), once four outliers (India, Sudan, South Korea and Sierra Leone)
are excluded from the larger sample, and two outliers (El Salvador and Sudan) are excluded from the
smaller sample. Regression (4) satisfies the Sargan over-identification test (do not reject the null hypoth-
esis of valid instruments), but regression (2) does not. Regression (4) also satisfies the Hausman test
(reject the null hypothesis that OLS estimates are efficient and unbiased). All regressions include a
constant and control for country size (POP and AREA).
e. anderson, p. j. g. tang, and a. wood 591
positive effect, all as expected. The effects of INST and TIME are statistically
significant at the 5% level in both cases, but the effect of DIST is statistically
significant only in column 1 (at the 10% level). The largest effect is of INST:
those of DIST and TIME are much smaller. Contrary to expectation, the impact
of LANG in column 1 is negative, but small and not statistically significant.
The results of the second stage of the test, where the dependent variable is PCY
and the explanatory variables are DIST, INST, and KL (using the predicted value
of KL from the first-stage regression as an instrument for KL), are in columns
(2) and (4). The coefficient of most interest is that on KL, which as expected is
positive in both cases. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level with the
smaller sample (column 4), but not with the larger sample (column 2). However,
the more significant result in column (4), using SMR as an instrument for
institutional quality, should probably be given greater weight, since the test for
over-identifying restrictions is satisfied in this case, whereas with DEQTR it is not.
Of the other variables, the effect of INST is also positive, large and statistically
significant (at the 5% level in the larger sample and the 10% level in the smaller
sample). This confirms that institutional quality raises wages in Southern countries
through other important channels and not only by encouraging K-worker
inflows. The effect of DIST, by contrast, is small and not statistically significant
in either sample.
To summarize, the results in Table 5 provide support for the hypothesis that
wages are higher in developing countries which have lower co-operation costs
and as a result get larger inflows of business travel and communication. Further
tests described in Anderson (2004) show that this result is robust to alternative
definitions of the South, measurement of GNP per capita at PPP exchange rates,
and the inclusion of additional control variables. Moreover, the effect is large
enough to be of interest to policy-makers: even the lower of the two estimates in
Table 5 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in inward business travel
could roughly double a developing country’s per capita income.15
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored the effects on wage inequalities of the increasing extent
to which highly-skilled workers who live in the North have become involved in
production in the South, as a result of improvements in travel and communications
facilities which reduce the cost of co-operation with Southern workers. These
effects are encapsulated in a model which treats highly-skilled workers as a semi-
mobile factor, whose services cost more in developing than in developed countries
because of the extra time it takes them to go and to work there. Reduction of the
amount of time wasted—a fall in co-operation costs—shrinks the North-South gap
..........................................................................................................................................................................
15 The standard deviation of PCY in the larger sample is 1.46. A one standard deviation increase in KL
therefore leads to an increase in PCY of 0.48 1.46¼ 0.70 log points, or 100%.
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in the wages of less-skilled workers, but widens (usually) the wage gap within the
North between highly-skilled and less-skilled workers.
Our empirical tests give support to the qualitative predictions of this model
about the effects of greater mobility of highly-skilled workers. The tests also suggest
that the impact on wage inequalities is quantitatively important. The increasing
extent to which highly-skilled US workers allocated their time to work on
developing countries, rather than on the domestic economy, could plausibly
have accounted for one-third of the overall rise in inequality in the top half of
the US income distribution in the 1990s. Moreover, developing countries whose
institutions and geography make their co-operation costs lower are more attractive
to Northern highly-skilled workers and as a result have substantially higher wages,
relative to wages in the North, than developing countries where co-operation with
local workers is more costly.
There is clearly much scope for further empirical testing of the model. But
the model itself could be extended in a number of directions. One is include
elements of the H-O approach, in which reduction of transport costs rather than
co-operation costs is the driving force. Wood (2002) divides our single ‘less-skilled’
category between medium-skilled and unskilled workers and our single A-good
into many A-goods of varying medium/unskilled labour intensity, so that reduction
of transport costs alters the relative wages of medium-skilled and unskilled
workers in the North and the South in accordance with H-O principles.
This combined model can account for some apparent effects of globalization on
wage inequalities which cannot be explained by either our model or a H-O model
on its own, including falling relative wages of unskilled workers in low-income
countries.
Another subject for further investigation is the supply of highly-skilled workers,
which we have taken as given. Like the South (in Section 5 of this paper), the North
consists of a number of different countries, in each of which some part of the
world’s stock of highly-skilled workers resides. The membership of this group is
not fixed: if a Southern country acquired a sufficiently large number of highly-
skilled residents, it would join the North. This could happen through migration,
as with the European colonization of North America, or through learning by
natives, as in the case of Japan. In particular, our model could be extended to
include the possibility that Southern workers, in some circumstances, learn from
the Northern highly-skilled workers with whom they co-operate in production.
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